Deregulation in New Zealand by Carl E. Walsh
FRBSF WEEKLY LETTER
October 14, 1988
Deregulation in New Zealand
Just five years ago, New Zealand was one of
the most heavily regulated Western economies.
Today, its financial sector is one of the least reg-
ulated. The effects of New Zealand's rapid finan-
cial deregulation may provide lessons for the u.s.
as it changes the regulatory landscape of its fi-
nancial sector.
In this and a subsequent Letter, the changes
occurring in New Zealand's financial sector are
discussed. This Letter reviews the changes in reg-
ulation and financial structure that have occurred
since 1984. Deregulation has had particularly
important effects on the conduct of monetary
policy, and these will be the chief focus of the
subsequent Letter.
Regulation in New Zealand
Prior to 1984, the financial sector in New Zea-
land operated in a highly regulated environment
designed to affect both the total volume of credit
in the economy and its sectoral allocation. Reg-
ulations imposed direct controls on financial in-
stitutions, segmented domestic financial markets,
and limited entry into the financial industry. Reg-
ulations affected the microeconomic structure of
the financial sector and provided the tools for
macroeconomic control over aggregate credit.
Direct controls on both interest rates and lending
activity played a major role in the regulatory re-
gime prior to 1984. These direct controls in-
cluded interest rate ceilings on a variety of loans
and deposits, restrictions on the composition of
the assets and liabilities of financial institutions,
restrictions on the volume of lending, and con-
trols on the foreign exchange activities of finan-
cial institutions. For example, all major financial
institutions were required to hold government or
local authority debt to meet required ratios of
public sector securities to total assets. These
ratios generated a captive demand for govern-
ment debt, particularly since the ratios in effect
in April 1984 ranged from 30 percent for finance
companies to 60 percent of assets for official
money market dealers.
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In addition to such requirements, the regulatory
framework governing financial institutions in
New Zealand also conferred specific cost ad-
vantages on the regulated institutions. These
restrictions and advantages varied by type of
institution. For example, trading banks were the
most heavily regulated members of the financial
services industry. They were prohibited from pay-
ing interest on deposits of less than 30 days ma-
turity, and the composition of their assets was
constrained by reserve asset-to-total deposit
ratios. On the other hand, only trading banks
had the authority to issue checking accounts and
to make use of the lender-of-Iast-resort facility
of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (New Zea-
land's central bank). Likewise, lending by build-
ing societies was limited to long-term, fixed-rate
mortgages. But they were also allowed to issue
savings deposits that paid higher interest rates
than deposits at trading banks.
The difference in the regulations governing vari-
ous types of financial institutions in New Zea-
land served to segment the financial sector. This
segmentation, it was argued, provided the gov-
ernment with leverage over the flow of credit to
certain key sectors of the economy. These in-
cluded agriculture, manufacturing exports, and
housing. Through regulation, the government was
able to create specialized institutions that would,
in theory at least, insure the provision of credit to
these key activities.
A second objective of financial regulation was to
keep interest rates low. Prior to 1984, ceilings on
many deposit and lending rates and rates on
government securities were kept artificially low.
The government stimulated demand for these
government securities by including them in the
assets trading banks could hold to satisfy reserve
asset ratios. Likewise, the government forced
nonbank financial institutions to hold such
securities by applying public sector security
ratios to these nonbank institutions.
Inefficiencies
Because assets satisfying the reserve asset andFRBSF:
public sector security ratios paid below-market
rates of interest, the regulatory system imposed a
discriminatory tax on the activities of regulated
financial institutions. This tax adversely affected
their ability to compete with institutions not sub-
ject to reserve requirements or subject to lower
ratios. The regulatgryframeworkthereforecon-
tributed to ~he developmentand growth of insti-
tutions subj~ct to.the light~st.regulatory.burden.
It also reducedthel~vel of int~rmediationserv-
icesprovidedbyth~ financiaLsector~ To.the
extent thatfinanciaLintermediaries reduce in-
formation costs in financing economic activity in
New Zealand, diminish~d interm~diation proba-
blyreduced real income in the economy.
Deregulation ... ..
Whil~ some moves towardsfinanciaLderegula-
tionwere und~.rtakeninNewZealand beginning
in 1976,controls.w~regeneraUy r~impos~d in
1981. \Nholesaled~regulation .didnotbegin until
after theelecti()npfa.Labourgov~rnment in July
19M. The newgovernmentbrought to office a
ne'v\! ~conornicphilqsophythat views private
markets as. best able to manage the allocation of
resources within an economy.
Withinnine mcmths oftaking office, the new gov-
ernment had instituted a sweeping program of
financi.al d~regulation.While.some aspects of
prudential r~gulation remained, all lending and
depositrates weredecontroled, cqntrols on.over-
seas borrowing.'v\!er~ relaxed, inter~st payments
onbank reserves were instituted, government
debt vvassold.on.an auction. basis,.all reserve
ratioJequirem~nts. on financial institutions were
abolished, and the exchange value of the New
Zealand dollar was floated.
Thes~ r~formseJjminated both the direct control
ofint~rest ratesthat had previously characterized
much.of New Zealand's rec~nt history, and the
bagi~rs thatsegmented the financi.alservices in-
dustry.Regulatory barriers to entry into the
industry were also abolished.
Contestable markets
The conc:ept of "cont~stabilityi'has guided the
NewZealand government's .policy of financial
reform. Economists.Baumol and Willig have
shown that when a market is contestable-that
is, when it has no barriers to entry and exit-:-it
will generate efficientoutcomes. In other words,
J
this theory suggests that even a monopolist will
not be able to exploit monopoly power if poten-
tial competitors can enter the market and under-
cut the monopolist whenever the firm tries to
earn above-normal profits by raising its price.
Traditionally, most industries in New Zealand
have had only one or two dominant firms. Many
argued thatregulation was necessary to limit the
adverse effects of such concentration. But the
new view suggests thatefficiency in the financial
services industry (and other industries) is best
served by ensuring that potential competitors to
existing firms are allowed to freely enter the
market even if the number of existing competi-
tors is small. Consequently, the New Zealand
government has sought to ensure that markets for
financial services are contestable by eliminating
artificial regulatorybarriers that have segmented
financial markets.
The effeCts of deregulation
To a large extent, the deregulation of New Zea-
land's financial sector has led to predictable
changes. Financial firms, formerly restricted by
the segmented market structure, have moved into
new fields inorder to capture the economies of
scope that arise whentwo products can be pro-
duced jointly at a lower cost than when these
goods are produced separately. Economies of
scope are most likely to be achieved when a firm
moves into activities closely related to its original
line ofbusiness. Thus, it is not surprising that
Economists Harper and Karacaoglu found diver-
sification by New Zealand's existing financial
firms since 1984 has been into closely related
fields.
The removal of barriers to entry has also had a
major impact on the number of competitors in
the financial services industry. Entry by foreign
financial firms, in particular, has increased dra-
matically. Many of the firms now applying for
banking licenses already had some operations in
New Zealand, but had previously been pre-
vented by regulation from expanding into full
retail banking.
Likewise, the removal of interest rate controls has
increased competition for funds. Formerly-regu-
lated institutions now compete by offering mar-
ket-based rates. Consequently, deposits at these
institutions grew rapidly after deregulation. Sincemany of the liabilities of these institutions are
components of the various monetary aggregates
in New Zealand, deregulation led to very high
growth rates in the aggregates. For example, real
M3, a broad aggregate, declined two percent per
year from 1981 to 1983, but grew nearly nine per-
cent per year in the period from 1984 to 1986.
Lessons for the u.s.
Because of its previous policy of limiting entry
into banking, deregulation in New Zealand is
leading to an increase in the number of banks. In
contrast, further deregulation in the u.s. may
lead to increased merger activity and a decline
in the number of independent financial institu-
tions because U.S. regulations, such as unit-
banking laws and restrictions on interstate
branching, keep the number of banks artificially
high. The theory of contestable markets suggests
that regulators should attempt to remove artificial
or regulatory barriersto entry and exit; whether
the number of firms remaining in the market is
large or small may be of little importance.
In the U.s., concern for financial sector stability
has often tempered enthusiasm for more com-
plete deregulation. The cost of regulation-a less
efficient financial sector-is viewed as a fair
price for ensuring financial stability. The New
Zealand government, in contrast, is attempting
to avoid such a tradeoff by separating policies
designed to promote financial sector efficiency
from policies designed to ensure financial sector
stability. Efficiency is promoted by minimizing
government interventions. Stability is promoted
through monetary policy, with some role for pru-
dential oversight.
Unlike the U.s., New Zealand does not have a
system of deposit insurance. Instead, the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand is responsible for monitor-
ing individual institutions and ensuring that
problems at one institution do not spread to
others (via bank runs, for example) and cause a
breakdown of the financial system. In this way,
New Zealand may avoid the tendency for deposit
insurance to create incentives for insured institu-
tions to invest in risky assets. However, a poten-
tial conflict may still exist between the desire to
minimize government intervention in financial
markets and the need to obtain the detailed
information necessary to monitor the riskiness
of individual financial institutions.
Conclusions
The policy of financial deregulation in New
Zealand has been guided by the principle that
competitive private markets can generally be
relied upon to ensure the efficient allocation of
resources. The theory of contestability has helped
to provide a consistent framework within which
policymakers can approach the issue of deregu-
lation. This theory requires the elimination of
regulatory barriers to entry. It also implies that
anti-trust policy should use ease of entry and not
the number of active firms as a measure of the
competitiveness of a given market.
Prior to 1984, New Zealand's economy paid a
high price in lost efficiency to ensure stability.
The recent reforms have emphasized efficiency
considerations almost entirely. Whether New
Zealand has adequately solved the problem of
promoting financial efficiency while protecting
financial stability remains to be seen.
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